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RAND Journal of Economics 
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Promoting safety through workers' compensation: 
the efficacy and net wage costs of injury insurance 
Michael J. Moore* 
and 
W. Kip Viscusi* * 
This article explores the effects of workers' compensation on fatality rates and wages using 
the 1982 Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the new occupationalfatality data issued by 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. The fatality rate depends upon 
the workers' compensation benefit variables in a manner that suggests that the safety incentive 
effects of higher insurance premiums offset any moral hazard effects. The estimates imply 
that in the absence of workers' compensation, fatality rates would increase by over 20%. 
Premium levels substantially overstate the cost of workers' compensation, due primarily to 
a direct wage offset from higher benefits. An indirect wage offset resulting from the decrease 
in risk caused by workers' compensation augments the direct wage effects. The indirect ofset 
is relatively small, equalling about 10% of the total. 
1. Introduction 
* The fundamental interdependence of job risks and wages has been a focal point of the 
labor economics literature dealing with nonpecuniary job characteristics. Higher levels of 
risk cause workers to demand higher wages, and these wage-risk trade-offs, in turn, establish 
market incentives for safety.' The introduction of workers' compensation establishes an 
additional dimension. Higher levels of workers' compensation benefits should dampen the 
wage premiums for risk demanded by the workers, and the funding mechanism for workers' 
compensation should provide incentives for safety.2 
* Fuqua School of Business, Duke University 
* * Duke University 
An earlier version of this article was presented at Northwestern University and at Duke University. The 
comments provided by the seminar participants and the comments provided by Gary Zarkin, Alvin Klevorick, 
James Poterba, and two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. Viscusi's research was supported by the 
endowment of the George G. Allen chair at Duke University, and Moore's research was supported in part by the 
Business Associates Fund at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. 
' See, for example, Brown ( 1980), Thaler and Rosen ( 1976), and Viscusi ( 1979, 1983). Also, see the reviews 
by Bailey ( 1980) and Rosen ( 1986). 
2 The overall structure of workers' compensation benefits is no doubt endogeneous, but state legislatures 
modify these programs so infrequently that this complication can be ignored for the time period covered by most 
data bases. 
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A key economic and regulatory issue pertains to the efficacy of different compensation 
mechanisms in promoting safety. The primary market mechanism of compensating differ- 
entials creates substantial incentives for safety. The Occupational Safety and Health Ad- 
ministration (OSHA) provides an additional institutional mechanism for the direct regulation 
of risks. OSHA policies have failed to fulfill their initial promise, however, as observed safety 
effects are statistically significant, but of small magnitude.3 
Some economists advocate using an injury tax approach similar to the funding mech- 
anism for workers' compensation as a substitute for regulatory policies.4 In theory this 
approach could enhance safety levels; however, most formal statistical evidence documenting 
the workers' compensation-safety linkage indicates that the opposite is true-that the moral 
hazard effects dominate and that the increased benefits therefore lead to greater injury rates.5 
In the case of compensating differentials, we have a dollar price tag in terms of risk 
premiums paid. This is also true of workers' compensation. However, we do not as yet have 
a definitive estimate of the ultimate safety effect of workers' compensation. Because premiums 
are not always fully experience rated, particularly for small firms, and because moral hazard 
problems may exist, the extent of the safety incentive effect of workers' compensation is 
not clearcut.6 
One key to understanding the relationship between workers' compensation and accidents 
lies in the severity of the accidents considered. The majority of existing studies (Chelius, 
1982; Chelius and Smith, 1987; Butler and Worral, 1983; Worral and Butler, 1985; Ruser, 
1985; Krueger, 1988) have used a risk measure based largely on nonfatal accident rates, on 
some composite of fatal and nonfatal rates, or on measures of claims filed for nonfatal and 
fatal accidents. These studies all reached the same conclusion-that increased insurance 
benefits cause injury and claim rates to rise significantly. 
This result reflects an obvious limitation of injury rate and claim data. That is, risk 
measures such as total injury rates or lost workday case rates include claims for injuries 
that may not, in fact, have occurred. This fact has led most researchers to conclude that 
moral hazard effects dominate the safety effects of injury insurance. Furthermore, it makes 
it impossible to distinguish whether there is any safety effect at all. 
Evidence contrary to this finding is limited. However, it appears that when the risk 
measure more accurately captures the severity of accidents, benefit increases have a negative 
effect on risk levels for more severe risks. For example, Chelius (1976) found that the 
introduction of workers' compensation in the United States led to a decrease in fatality 
rates over the period 1900-1940. Chelius (1982) also found a significant negative relationship 
between benefit levels and lost workdays per case, a risk measure that varies with the severity 
of the injury. 
This general result-that benefit increases increase the incidence of less severe accidents 
but decrease their severity-provides our motivation in this article. The most severe accidents 
should reflect very little moral hazard. Deaths cannot be falsely claimed, of course, and the 
high values that workers implicitly attach to the lives saved suggest that workers are not 
willing to substitute fatality benefits for their own lives. Therefore, if workers' compensation 
provides any safety incentives to firms, these will be reflected most strongly in the fatality 
rate data. 
The primary objective of this article is, therefore, to assess the performance of workers' 
compensation in reducing fatality rates. Our estimates indicate a dramatic safety effect, 
3 See Viscusi (1986) and the references contained therein for an assessment of OSHA's impact on safety. 
4 See, in particular, Smith (1976), Diamond (1977), and Viscusi (1983). Chelius (1976) and Fishback 
(1987) have examined the effects of changing from a negligence standard to a strict liability standard, such as 
workers' compensation. 
5 See, for example, Chelius (1977, 1982), Butler (1983), Ruser (1985), and Krueger and Burton (1989). 
6 Chelius and Smith (1987) and Ruser (1985) have explored the role of experience rating in determining 
costs and safety levels. 
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particularly when compared with the evidence regarding the impact of OSHA and the 
previous evidence on the effects of workers' compensation on nonfatal injuries. A related 
issue that we consider is the net dollar cost to firms of responding to these safety incentives. 
Examining the dollar premiums for workers' compensation is a useful starting point for 
such analyses; it does not, however, give a complete measure of the financial incentives, 
since workers will accept a wage reduction in return for the insurance coverage. Furthermore, 
if greater safety is promoted by workers' compensation, the required compensating wage 
differential for risk and the level of injury costs to the firm will both be reduced. Thus, 
workers' compensation has both direct and indirect effects on workers' wages, and these 
effects offset both the cost of the insurance premiums and the employer's expenditures on 
safety. 
Our analysis extends the research on the labor market effects of workers' compensation 
in two important ways: it analyzes the joint determination of wages and risks in a structural 
hedonic model, and it computes the total effect of benefits on wages by taking the indirect 
effect into account. Our focus on fatality rates to minimize moral hazard problems is 
also new. 
A stylized summary of our findings is as follows: increases in fatality rates increase 
wages, while increases in workers' compensation benefits lower both wages and fatality 
rates. This risk reduction, in turn, has an additional wage effect, equal to about 10% of the 
direct benefit effect. 
The general spirit of these results is to document the constructive economic functions 
served by workers' compensation. These findings run counter to the consensus in the lit- 
erature as summarized on page 197 of the 1987 Economic Report of the President: "A 
growing body of research has found that workers' compensation benefits have unfavorable 
effects on safety. Higher benefits appear to increase both the frequency of work injuries and 
the number of compensation claims filed." In contrast, our results indicate that workers' 
compensation generates truly dramatic reductions in workplace fatalities. 
2. Overview of the economic relationships 
* Our empirical analysis focused on two equations-a risk equation and a wage equation. 
Neither of our equations was unprecedented in the literature, although they had typically 
been analyzed separately.7 All of the variables of interest in the fatality rate (risk) equation 
are related theoretically to workers' compensation. The funding mechanism for workers' 
compensation creates safety incentives for firms that should increase the safety level provided. 
Even for relatively small firms that are not perfectly experience rated, the insurance under- 
writing procedures should lead to some link between workplace conditions and insurance 
premiums. 
A potentially offsetting influence is that of moral hazard, as more generous benefit 
levels lead workers to decrease their levels of care. This aspect of worker behavior is just as 
unambiguous theoretically as the opposite safety incentive effect for employers. Furthermore, 
a number of studies have indicated that more generous benefits lead to more extended 
periods of recovery and to the possible overreporting of injuries.8 These abuses are likely 
to be more responsive to the benefit level than to the fatality rate, which is the subject of 
this study. Although one cannot rule out the possibility of a dominant moral hazard effect 
on theoretical grounds, the high estimated value of life that workers receive through wage- 
risk trade-offs suggests that workers would not endanger their lives to a substantial degree 
to receive a more generous ex post compensation that will benefit their surviving heirs. In 
addition, a worker's ability to report a fatality when one has not occurred is obviously quite 
7 Butler ( 1983) and Garen ( 1988) are exceptions to this. 
8 See Butler and Worral ( 1983, 1985), Kniesner and Leeth ( 1989, 1988), and Krueger ( 1988). 
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limited. Our working hypothesis was that higher benefits lower fatality risk levels; therefore, 
the workers' compensation variable was expected to have a negative sign in the fatality rate 
equation. 
The second variable of interest-the square of the workers' compensation variable- 
pertains to the nonlinearity of the effect of workers' compensation on fatality rates. This 
relationship is highly complex once all feedback effects, such as moral hazard, are taken 
into account. We therefore included a quadratic term to capture the nonlinearities. 
The third workers' compensation variable captures the interaction between workers' 
compensation and firm size. The cost of an accident to a firm in terms of increased insurance 
premiums depends crucially on the degree to which firms are experience rated.9 Large firms, 
particularly those that self-insure, will be rated according to their own accident experience 
and feel the full impact of accidents on their insurance premiums. Thus, the safety incentives 
should be greater in larger firms.10 
The variables included in the wage equation represent less complex influences. Wages 
should increase with the risk level, following Adam Smith's proposition that hazardous jobs 
will command compensating differentials. For economically similar reasons, higher levels 
of workers' compensation should lead to a wage reduction; ex post compensation for job 
risks should decrease the level of ex ante compensation required. The extent of the offset 
depends on the attractiveness of the insurance provided, which is determined by factors 
such as the degree of insurance loading and the risk level. 
3. The sample and the variables 
* Our primary data source in this study was the University of Michigan Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal survey of worker characteristics and 
their employment experiences beginning in the year 1968. Our analysis focused on the 1982 
wave of the data. We selected the 1982 wave of the PSID because it provided the detail 
necessary to enable a precise matching of our primary variables of interest-the job risk 
and workers' compensation variables-to the sample members. The time period covered 
by this wave of the survey was the most appropriate for the risk measure that we used. The 
PSID data have been used in previous applications of the compensating differential model, 
such as Viscusi (1979), Moore and Viscusi (1988a, 1988b, 1989, forthcoming), and Viscusi 
and Moore (1989). 
The PSID data contain two subsamples. One includes a group of workers who were 
selected because their incomes fell below a specified poverty standard; the other consists of 
randomly selected individuals. To preserve the representativeness of our data, we excluded 
the poverty subsample. Our 1982 PSID subsample, which measures labor market outcomes 
for 1981, contains 1,173 observations after the exclusion of farmers and farm managers, 
workers who are not household heads, government employees (for whom no risk data were 
available), and cases with missing data. The sample is broadly representative of the working 
population, considering these exclusions. Table 1 defines the variables used in the empirical 
analysis and summarizes their means and standard deviations. 
The primary focus of our empirical analysis was on the interrelationships among wages, 
hazardous working conditions, firm size, and insurance for job-related injuries. Because the 
PSID data does not include information on job risks, workers' compensation benefits, or 
firm size, we collected these measures from external published sources and matched the 
information to workers in the PSID. 
The death risk data, which first became available in 1987, consist of data collected by 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as part of its ongoing 
9 Ruser ( 1985) discussed these rating practices in detail. 
'0 Chelius and Smith ( 1987) analyzed the combined role of compliance costs and premiums and found that 
costs per dollar of loss are U-shaped with respect to size. Our analysis provides empirical evidence on the total size- 
safety relationship below. 
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TABLE 1 Sample Characteristics 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) Variable Definitions 
RISK 6.61 NTOF risk variable. Number of fatal accidents per 100,000 
(8.54) workers in the worker's industry on a state-specific basis. 
WCMAX 239.58 Maximum benefit level for temporary total disability under 
(80.65) state workers' compensation program. 
SIZE 44.02 Firm size variable: Number of workers by state and 
(75.74) industry. 
WAGE 485.74 Computed weekly wage in 1981. 
(215.97) 
FEMALE 0.17 Sex dummy variable: 1 if worker is female, 0 otherwise. 
(0.38) 
BLACK 0.08 Race dummy variable: 1 if worker is black, 0 otherwise. 
(0.27) 
KIDS 1.00 Number of dependent children. 
(1.15) 
MARRIED 0.71 Marital status dummy variable: 1 if worker has ever been 
(0.45) married, 0 otherwise. 
HEALTH 0.07 Health status dummy variable: 1 if worker has a serious 
(0.26) physical or nervous condition that limits the amount of 
work he can do, 0 otherwise. 
EDUCA TION 12.92 Number of grades completed. 
(2.51) 
EXPERIENCE 11.74 Years worked full-time since age 18. 
(10.53) 
JOB TENURE 5.08 Years worked on current job. 
(6.28) 
UNION 0.30 Union status dummy variable: 1 if worker's job is covered 
(0.46) by a collective bargaining agreement, 0 otherwise. 
BLUE COLLAR 0.55 Collar-color dummy variable: 1 if worker is in a blue-collar 
(0.50) occupation, 0 otherwise. 
National Traumatic Occupational Fatality (NTOF) project. The NIOSH initiated the NTOF 
study to provide a more accurate assessment of fatality risks and, as a by-product, to reconcile 
differences in existing sources of risk data-primarily the occupational fatality data provided 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the National Safety Council (NSC), and the 
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The discrepancies in the perspectives on job 
risks provided by these sources are large. In 1984, for instance, the estimated numbers of 
fatalities in the BLS, NSC, and NCHS data were 3,750, 11,500, and 4,960, respectively, 
while the NTOF five-year average for the period 1980-1984 was approximately 7,000 fa- 
talities per year. Some of the discrepancies can be explained by differences in the coverage 
of each survey. The NSC, for instance, is the only source that includes government workers, 
small firms, and self-employed individuals. It is doubtful, however, that inclusion of these 
omitted groups would triple the BLS death rate and thus bring it more into line with the 
NSC estimate. 
The NTOF data have a major advantage for any study of workers' compensation, since 
they are available by state, which is the degree of disaggregation that is required to sensibly 
analyze the state-run workers' compensation programs. Previously published risk data do 
not reflect state differences, creating potentially serious comparability problems."' Using 
" In those studies that have analyzed the impact of workers' compensation on injury rates, Butler ( 1983) 
used time series data on risks and benefits within a single state (South Carolina) to circumvent this problem. Chelius 
(1982) used unpublished data on two-digit (SIC) manufacturing industries for 36 states, and Ruser (1985) used 
unpublished BLS injury data for 25 three-digit manufacturing industries across 41 states. Of the three studies, only 
504 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
the national level BLS risk data to analyze the relationship between wages and insurance 
benefits creates an obvious source of error, since the national risk data ignore interstate 
variation in risks within industries.12 The sampling error inherent in the BLS survey and 
the interindustry risk variation lost as a consequence of aggregation create substantial mea- 
surement error problems. 
The NTOF data are not plagued by these same problems. Fatality rates in the currently 
available data were constructed from a census of occupational fatalities during the years 
1980-1984 and are classified by state and industry. As a consequence, there is no sampling 
error due to survey techniques, and both interstate and interindustry risk variations are 
captured by the data. One limitation of the NTOF data base is that it does not provide 
information on nonfatal injury rates. 
Since the NTOF data have only recently been released, the implications of the new 
risk data for our understanding of the role of job risks in the labor market have not yet 
been fully explored. The first study to compare the implications of using the NTOF data 
rather than the BLS data is Moore and Viscusi (1988b). This research indicates that there 
exists a substantial amount of measurement error across industries in the BLS data and 
that using the BLS data lowers the estimated value of life by over one-half. Furthermore, 
in all of the wage equation specifications we tested for this study, the NTOF data yielded 
much stronger statistical results. 
The second key variable we used is the measure of workers' compensation benefits. 
Previous analyses have utilized a range of measures, including the weekly wage replacement 
rate (Viscusi and Moore, 1987; Moore and Viscusi, 1988b, 1989; Chelius, 1982; Arnould 
and Nichols, 1983), weekly benefits (Ruser, 1985), annual payments by industry (Butler, 
1983), and workers' compensation premium rates (Dorsey and Walzer, 1983). In most 
cases, benefits for the most frequent type of claim-temporary total disabilities-have been 
used as a proxy for all types of benefits, including those for temporary total, permanent 
total, and permanent partial disabilities, and for fatality benefits. Butler, however, did attempt 
to separately identify the effects of each type of benefit with some success and constructed 
a benefit index using principal components analysis. Viscusi and Moore (1987) documented 
the high correlations among the various benefit categories that make separation of their 
effects difficult. We based the benefit measure used here on the temporary total disability 
category. 
State workers' compensation benefits are determined by a formula that specifies both 
a minimum benefit amount and a benefit cap. If two-thirds of the worker's pretax wage 
falls between these limits, the benefits paid equal two-thirds of the wage. The average pretax 
wage replacement rate in our sample is lower than .67, since many workers' wages exceeded 
the cap.'3 Because of their mechanical dependence upon the wage, specific measures of an 
individual's workers' compensation benefits create endogeneity problems in the estimation 
of wage and risk equations. In previous wage equation studies, instrumental variables es- 
timation has been used to solve this problem.14 
Butler attempted to analyze the combined impact of benefits on both injury rates and wages. Butler's results are 
not conclusive however, and the restricted scope of the South Carolina data limits the generalizability of his results. 
12 In the NTOF data, the average risks within one-digit SIC industry classifications are typically two to five 
times the size of their standard errors, so the interstate risk variation is more pronounced for some industries than 
for others. 
13 Workers who qualified for the minimum benefit constitute a small portion of the sample ( 1% ). We treated 
these workers as if they were above the minimum for estimation purposes. We attempted to add a switching variable 
similar to the variable d, but it was not possible to estimate a first-stage probit equation to construct the selectivity 
variable corresponding to workers whose wage put them below the minimum benefit level. Even the simplest 
models, containing only a few of the variables in the probit equations described in the text, did not work. 
14 Butler ( 1983) and Garen ( 1988) used primarily instrumental variables to estimate the risk equations in 
their studies. 
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As an alternative, in this study we focused our attention on the role that changes in 
benefit ceilings (WCMAX) play in the determination of fatality risks. This approach has 
two desirable features. First, the benefit ceiling is one of the key workers' compensation 
policy variables and varies widely across states. Second, benefit ceilings are set by state 
boards and are less likely to be endogenous in the risk and wage equations. 
The benefit ceiling will affect wage and risk levels of all workers when each worker's 
weekly wage is uncertain. In this case, increases in benefit ceilings increase the spread of 
potential benefits. Furthermore, increases in benefit ceilings are typically accompanied by 
increases in benefit floors. Consequently, benefit ceilings act as a proxy for ex ante expected 
benefits, and increases in these ceilings will benefit all workers. It is likely, however, that 
variations in the ceiling will have a larger effect for workers for whom the ceiling acts as a 
constraint. We allowed for these differences by estimating a switching regression model, 
where the switching variable is defined as 
1 
if (2/ 3) WAGEi 2 WCMAXi 
di = 
0o if not. 
We describe the risk and insurance variables that were our principal focus at the top 
of Table 1. The variable RISK is the average number of fatalities per 100,000 workers for 
the years 1980-1984, as measured by the NIOSH. The overall fatality rate in our sample 
of 6.6 deaths per 100,000 workers is approximately 30% higher than the BLS death rate for 
this period. The benefit ceiling variable, WCMAX, equals the maximum benefit level for 
which the worker qualifies, based on weekly insurance benefits for temporary total disability 
as reported annually by the United States Chamber of Commerce (1982). We matched the 
RISK variable to workers by their reported state and industry and matched WCMAX 
by state. 
The third variable that we collected externally is the firm size variable, SIZE. Since 
the PSID data does not include such a measure, we matched average firm size data from 
United States Department of Commerce (1984) to workers in the sample by state and one- 
digit industry. Workers in the transportation, utilities and sanitary services, and the finance, 
insurance, and real estate industries were excluded from our sample in the matching process 
because size data were not available for these industries. 
A secondary issue is the use of state dummy variables as regressors in the risk equation. 
State dummies were used by Ruser (1985) and Krueger (1988) to control for interstate 
differences in the types of injuries that firms are required to report. The inclusion of state 
dummies makes it difficult to estimate the workers' compensation effects, however, since 
these vary primarily by state. Fortunately, this problem did not arise for the risk variable 
considered here. Firms in all states must report on-the-job fatalities, and the definition of 
what constitutes a fatality is certainly clear-cut. 
The primary measure of pecuniary compensation that we used is the worker's weekly 
wage (WAGE) for 1981, the year covered by the 1982 PSID data. The explanatory variables 
in the WAGE equations consist of a group of measures representing personal characteristics, 
location measures, and characteristics of the worker's job, including the job risk and workers' 
compensation. Personal background variables include the worker's sex (FEMALE dummy 
variable) and race (BLACK dummy variable). Although these variables primarily reflect 
tastes, they can also represent the effects of market discrimination or the effects of worker 
traits that are unobservable to the firm, but are correlated with these characteristics. The 
human capital variables are standard for wage equation studies and reflect productivity 
limitations (HEALTH), years of formal schooling (EDUCATION), and acquired training 
that is either general (EXPERIENCE) or specific (JOB TENURE) in nature. We included 
state dummy variables as indicators of interstate wage differentials due to differences in the 
cost of living and local labor market demand conditions. The job variables available in the 
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PSID data set include a dummy variable for the worker's collective bargaining status ( UNION 
dummy variable) and the collar-color dummy variable (BLUE COLLAR) that indicates 
whether a worker is in a blue-collar occupation. This latter variable captures the role of 
omitted job characteristics that are correlated with blue-collar occupations. 
4. Estimation procedure 
* To determine the effect of the benefit maximum on fatality risk levels, we regressed the 
variable RISK on the three benefit variables, WCMAX, WCMAX2, and (WCMAX)(SIZE). 
We also included industry dummy variables and SIZE as control variables in the vector 
XR.*5 The RISK equations estimated are 
RISKi = at'XRi + a4WCMAX, + 'bbWCMAX? + oa',(WcMAXi)(SIZEi) + E1 (1 ) 
and 
RISKoi = a'XRi + acgWCMAXi + aobbWCMAX + a c (WCMAXi)(SIZEi) + 0oi, (2) 
where the indicators 1 and 0 identify whether the worker is above or below the benefit 
ceiling. 
Consistent estimates of the parameters in equations (1) and (2) require that 
E[Elil di = 1] = E[coil di = O] = 0. 
As shown by Heckman (1979), Maddala (1983), and others, these expectations equal 
E[EliI di = 1] =-o-.i 
and 
E[coi I di = 0] = couXoi, 
where 
_ q(y'Zi) 
4,(-YZi) 
and 
I (- i 'Zi) 
and where 4i and (Di denote the standard normal density and distribution functions. The 
covariance terms, oju, represent the covariances between the Eji and the normalized error 
term, u, in the reduced form selection equation: 
Prob[d = 1] = Prob[(2/3)WAGE- WCMAX 2 0] 
= Prob[--y'Z &lt; u]. 
Candidates for variables to include in the vector Z include any variables that cause 
variation in either the wage or in the maximum benefit level. However, since the wage is 
endogenous in the risk equation, any variable that is not independent of the individual, 
specific component of the wage does not qualify as an instrumental variable. Consequentially, 
we focused our attention on variables that cause variation in WCMAX instead. In particular, 
we used a model developed by Danzon ( 1988) that explains the variation in WCMAX and, 
therefore, in d. Our instruments in the probit equation included the percentage of the 
" The industry categories include mining, construction, manufacturing, communication, wholesale trade, 
retail trade, and services. The services dummy was excluded for estimation purposes. 
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residents in each state whose age is less than 65 years, the percentage of blacks, the percentage 
of females, and the percentage of those with less than 12 years of schooling as demographic 
mix variables. The percentage of firms with more than 100 employees, the percentage of 
firms with less than 20 employees, and the percentage of workers in each one-digit industry 
served as industrial mix variables. We took these as our minimal instrument set (i.e., the 
set of instrumental variables in which we had the most faith) and experimented with adding 
other variables that affect WCMAX in order to increase the precision of our estimates. Our 
final instrument set included variables representing the individual worker's number of de- 
pendent children and marital status and a regional dummy variable for the southeast, in 
addition to the minimal set. We assumed that these variables are exogeneous with respect 
to risk in the sense that if the proportion of any one of the demographic mix variables or 
any one of the industrial mix variables within a state should change, then there should be 
no change in the underlying riskiness of the job that is not accounted for by the exogenous 
variables in the risk equation. 
To test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we estimated an alternative 
RISK equation in which the variables in Z were included as regressors. The results discussed 
below, which are based on RISK equations with the Z variables excluded, are not sensitive 
to the exclusion restrictions, particularly in the In RISK equation, where the signs and 
significance levels remain unchanged. Furthermore, the main findings discussed below also 
survive the relaxation of this restriction when RISK is converted to the log-odds form. 
We therefore estimated the equations 
RISKi, = oa'lXRi + caWCMAXi + a bWCMAXi 
+ a4 s(WCMAXi)(SIZEi) 
- aluli + e i (3) 
and 
RISKoi = a'cXRi + o1WCMAX + a bWCMAX 
+ ag( WCMAXi)(SIZEi) + aouXoi + Eo, (4) 
where Xji was estimated in a first-stage probit equation. 
Combining equations (3) and (4) yields the single RISK equation 
RISKi = a'XRi + (a' - ac)XRi,i + a4WCMAXii + acWCMAX( 1 - i) 
+ abbWCMAX2 Ii + aobWCMAX(1 - (Ii)+ a, (WCMAXi)(SIZEi) ,i 
+ ca,s(WCMAXi)(SIZEi)(1 - 4i) + (aou - au)ki + E*. (5) 
Combining equations (3) and (4) in this manner allows a test of the restriction 
al = a'b. If this restriction is not rejected, its imposition increases the efficiency of the 
estimation, giving more precise estimates of the workers' compensation effects.16 On the 
other hand, the standard errors estimated in equation (5) are suspect, since estimation of 
a single, combined equation such as this imposes the restriction that the variances of the 
error terms in equations (3) and (4) be equal. We adjusted the standard error estimates by 
using the formula in Maddala (1983) to correct for this problem. 
As discussed in Section 2, our hypothesized effects of workers' compensation on RISK 
were aC < 0, abb > 0, and a cK < 0. If moral hazard offsets the safety incentive effect, the 
net effect of workers' compensation will be to raise the fatality risk. Our results there- 
fore provide a direct test of the net incentive effect of workers' compensation. Based 
upon our interpretation of WCMAX as a proxy for expected benefits, we also expected 
I\l, > °IkC for k = b, bb, bs. 
16 There were no significant differences between these coefficients when the models were estimated separately. 
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5. RISK equation estimates 
* Table 2 presents least squares estimates of the RISK and in RISK equations described 
above. The coefficient estimates reported represent the coefficients multiplied by b or 
( 1- () to facilitate the comparison of the effects between workers above and below the maxi- 
mum. The variable SELECTIVITY denotes the Mill's ratio variable. The total effects of 
the key explanatory variables are presented at the bottom of Table 2. 
The results given in Table 2 indicate that workers' compensation serves on balance as 
a safety incentive mechanism. The WCMAX variable has a negative sign and very strong 
statistical significance in all four cases, indicating a large negative benefit impact on fatality 
levels. The nonlinearity of the WCMAX effect is also very strong, as evidenced by the 
significant positive coefficients for WCMAX2. The negative effect of (WCMAX)(SIZE), 
which is statistically significant in the RISK equation for workers above or below the max- 
imum, indicates that rating firms more in line with their experience serves to reinforce the 
dampening effect of workers' compensation on risks. Furthermore, the (WCMAX)(SIZE) 
interaction is jointly significant with the SIZE variable in both equations. The total SIZE 
effect is negative in both cases, which is consistent with the previous findings in the literature. 
Both economies of scale in the production of safety and experience rating exert downward 
pressure on risk levels. 
The finding that workers' compensation benefits exert a significant negative effect on 
fatality rates in unprecedented in the literature. Of the major studies that have identified 
TABLE 2 Estimates of the Risk Equations Coefficients 
and Standard Errors 
Dependent Variable 
Coefficient (Variable)a RISK In RISK 
a,(SIZE) 0.012 -1.14E-3* 
(0.009) (0.70E-3) 
b (WCMAXI d = 1) -1.26E-2** -2.56E-3** 
(0.50E-2) (0.55E-3) 
a4(WCMAXI d = 0) -0.78E-2** -1.47E-3** 
(0.31 E-2) (0.38E-3) 
abb(WCMAX2Id = 1) 2.03E-5** 3.52E-6** 
(1.01 E-5) (1.07E-6) 
abb( WCMAXId = 0) 1.54E-5* 2.56E-6** 
(0.81 E-5) (1.23E-6) 
abs((WCMAX)(SIZE) I d = 1) -4.15E-5* -1.67E-6 
(2.51 E-5) (2.66E-6) 
ebs((WCMAX)(SIZE) I d = 0) -2.27E-5* -1.14E-6 
(1.26E-5) (1.42E-6) 
(o2u -aJ)(SELECTIVITY) 7.197* 1.364** 
(4.136) (0.453) 
R 2 0.769 0.702 
Total Effects of Explanatory Variablesb 
WCMAX -6.09E-3 -8.40E-3 
x2(WCMAX, df = 3) 16.9** 42.5** 
SIZE -3.41E-3 -1.81E-3 
x2(SIZE, df = 2) 10.5** 107.7** 
* Statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, one-tailed test. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% confidence level, one-tailed test. 
a Also included as control variables were seven industry dummy variables. 
b Evaluated at the sample means. 
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statistically significant effects, Chelius (1982) found a positive relationship between benefits 
and injury frequencies and Ruser (1985) found the same relationship between benefits and 
injuries that resulted in lost workday cases. Likewise, Butler and Worral (1985) found a 
positive effect of benefits on the claims rate for temporary total disabilities. Most recently, 
Krueger (1988) found a positive relationship between benefits and participation rates for 
workers' compensation programs, except for female workers. On the other hand, Chelius 
also found a negative relationship between benefits and injury severity as measured by total 
lost workdays, and Krueger and Burton found no relationship between workers' compen- 
sation costs and injury rates. 
The most likely reason why our results run counter to those in the literature appears 
to be the nature of the risk variable. There are two aspects of moral hazard reflected in the 
injury rate studies-reduced care and the filing of spurious claims. The available evidence 
indicates that the latter effect can be substantial. Butler and Worral (1983, 1985) have 
documented a positive effect of benefits on both the filing of claims and their duration, and 
Smith (1989) has found that a large number of claims for sprains and strains occur on 
Monday mornings, which suggests that workers might postpone treatment for some injuries 
suffered at home in order to qualify for benefits. For two reasons, it is not likely that reduced 
care or the filing of false claims is reflected in our data. Evidence on workers implicit 
valuations of life suggests that increases in the risk of death are not adequately compensated 
for by increased benefits. More importantly, the ability to file a false claim is severely limited 
for fatalities. 
Another important difference in our risk variable is the process by which the NTOF 
data were collected. Since the NTOF data represent a census of fatalities on the job, they 
are not subject to the sampling error that is inherent in the risk data collected by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and other agencies. Evidence presented by Moore and Viscusi (1988b) 
indicates that this error is not entirely random, which may also help to explain the differences 
in our results. 
6. Wage equation estimates 
* The main result of the preceding section, i.e., that workers' compensation benefits exert 
strong downward pressure on injury rates, identifies a third linkage in the wage-risk-benefit 
model. The majority of the empirical research on wage-risk and wage-benefit trade-offs 
indicates that increases in job risks cause wages to rise, while increases in workers' com- 
pensation benefits generate wage reductions.'7 To the extent that benefit increases cause 
risks to fall, these previous analyses have understated the estimates of the wage-benefit trade- 
off by ignoring the indirect effect of benefits on wages through risks. 
To explore the complete wage-risk-benefit model, we used the estimated risk-benefit 
trade-offs from Table 2 in conjunction with a standard compensating differential wage 
equation. Again, we estimated switching equations for workers above and below the max- 
imum. Combining the wage equations yields 
WAGEi = O'Xwi + ('l - 1o)Xwibi + bRRISKibi + ° RISK, (1 - bi) + b(RISKi) 
X (WCMAXi)(b + bb(RISKi)(WCMAXi)(1 - Ii) + (2u - au)+ki + V*. (6) 
The control variables in the vector Xw included state dummy variables, years of job tenure, 
experience, and education, SIZE, number of dependents, marital, health, and union status 
dummy variables, and the blue-collar occupation dummy variable. Squared values of job 
tenure and experience were also included. 
17 See, for example, Viscusi and Moore (1987). 
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State dummies were included in the wage equation to control for differences in the 
cost of living and in labor market conditions across states. The remaining control variables 
are standard in wage equations. We did not use a measure of city size in the results reported, 
since it was never close to statistically significant; its exclusion did not alter the results. 
The coefficients in equation (6) should have the signs: 
Rj?30 > 0; 3 L0 &lt; 0; and Ib JI > labI. 
These coefficients, in conjunction with those in equation (5), can then be used to compute 
the effect of an increase in WCMAX on WAGE. This effect equals 
~~WAGE = 
4~ + 0 1I - 4~ + (64 + 60 1 -4~))WCMAX] ~RS 
A9WCMAX R R b b a WCMAX 
+ [63 + 6b( 1 - 41)]RISK 
9RISK 
= AR + AbRISK. (7) 
a9WCMAX 
Using equation (5), we obtain 
B9RISK 
a WCMAX = ahl + a0( 1 - 4) + 2(a bb 4 + a bb (I - )) WCMAX 
+ (a 4 + A ( 1 - 4))SIZE 
= ab + abbWCMAX + absSIZE. (8) 
Combining equations (7) and (8) gives 
aWAGE 
d WCMAX - AR(ab + abbWCMAX + absSIZE) + AbRISK. (9) 
Previous estimates of wage-benefit trade-offs ignored the indirect effect represented by the 
first term in equation (9). If increases in the benefit ceiling reduce fatality rates, as indicated 
in Table 2, these previous findings understated the size of the trade-off, given AR > 0. 
Estimates of 9RISK/I WCMAX can be computed using the coefficients presented in 
Table 2. Using the estimates in either Column 1 or 2, we can see that a one dollar increase 
in WCMAX causes RISK to fall by about .006, when measured at the mean values of 
WCMAX ($239.00) and SIZE (44.0). To determine the total wage offset, we need only to 
use the estimated parameters of the wage equation. 
o Estimates for equation (6). Table 3 presents estimates of the parameters of equation 
(6) for a number of different specifications of the dependent variable. In eacif case, prelim- 
inary regressions were estimated to test the hypothesis 's = /3g. Since this hypothesis was 
never rejected, we constrained these coefficients to be equal. Of these coefficients, we report 
only the compensating risk differential, 6R . In each of the equations estimated, bR is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 % confidence level. Once again, we corrected the standard 
errors to allow for different variances in each regime. 
The benefit variables also perform in the expected manner. Increases in the benefit 
ceiling cause wages to fall significantly for workers above the ceiling (63I &lt; 0). Increases in 
the ceiling also cause wages to fall for workers for whom the maximum is not binding 
(6 b &lt; 0) , and the amount of the decrease is less for these workers (I | I | > I 63 | ). 
Although the 63 coefficients only approach significance at the 5% level, they are always 
jointly significant with the 3' coefficients and are significant at the 10% level in Column 3. 
This weak effect can be due to one of two things. As hypothesized, it might be the case that 
increases in the benefit maximum are not valued by workers whose wages fall below the 
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TABLE 3 Estimates of the Wage Equations Coefficients and Standard Errors 
After-tax in (After-tax 
Coefficient Weekly Weekly in (Weekly Weekly 
(Variable)a Wage Wage Wage) Wage) 
SR(RISK) 5.20** 2.66** 1.12E-2** 8.13E-3** 
(1.95) (1.08) (0.42E-2) (3.55E-3) 
b6I((RISK)(WCMAX) Id = 1) - 1.22E-2* -5.69E-3* -2.45E-5* -1.73E-5* 
(0.57E-2) (3.19E-3) (1.14E-5) (0.97E-5) 
60b((RISK)( WCMAX) I d = 0) -0.40E-2 -4.62E-3 -0.98E-5 -0.71 E-5 
(0.32E-2) (3.85E-3) (0.64E-5) (0.SSE-5) 
( -2u -a,)(SELECTIVITY) -322.85* -192.19* -0.609* -0.595* 
(155.87) (86.86) (0.336) (0.284) 
R 2 0.451 0.411 0.465 0.41 
* Statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, one-tailed test. 
* Statistically significant at the 1% confidence level, one-tailed test. 
a Also included as explanatory variables were measures of the worker's sex, race, marital status, number of 
dependent children, health status, education, experience, job tenure, union status, firm size, and state dummy 
variables. 
maximum. Alternatively, the lack of significance may be due to collinearity problems as- 
sociated with the variables WCMAX4 and WCMAX( 1 - ). 
The selectivity coefficients in Table 3 are all negative and significant. Since these coef- 
ficients measure the correlation between vji and ui (the unobserved variables in the wage 
equation and the selection equation), the negative sign is not surprising: both mu and cou 
should be positive due to wealth effects. Empirically, it appears that aIu > a2u The selectivity 
terms in the RISK equations, which are all positive and significant, also indicate the presence 
of wealth effects. Wealthier workers will buy off some risk and are more likely to have wages 
that exceed the maximum; therefore, the error terms in the risk equation and the selection 
equation should be negatively related. 
7. Implications for market behavior 
* The most important implication of the results reported in Tables 2 and 3 is the perspective 
they give on the market effects of workers' compensation that extend beyond the payment 
of premiums and compensation. Consider first the safety incentive effect. Although the net 
impact of insurance benefits on RISK is theoretically indeterminate, the estimates of the 
RISK equations indicate empirically that benefit increases exert considerable pressure on 
firms to improve safety levels, thus reducing fatality risk levels. Indeed, using the estimates 
from Table 2, if benefits were nonexistent, the average fatality rate would rise by approxi- 
mately 1.5 deaths per 100,000 workers, or an increase of 22%.18 The Table 2 results also 
indicate that benefits exert downward pressure on injury rates that diminishes as benefits 
rise. Using the estimates in Column 1 of Table 2, the safety effect continues to dominate 
up to a weekly benefit maximum of $325.00, or $375.00 in 1988 prices.19 
The second notable result concerns the wage-risk feedback effects of workers' com- 
pensation. If benefit increases cause fatalities to fall, as our results indicate, the net wage 
savings generated by the wage-benefit trade-off include an indirect effect due to the positive 
18 Using the risk-benefit trade-off in Column 2 of Table 2, the total effect of WCMAX on the fatality rate 
equals ( -0.0061)(240) = - 1.5 deaths per 100,000 workers. This result assumes that the point estimates are valid 
over the entire range of WCMAX, which may not be the case. 
'9 Setting aRISK/OWCMAX equal to zero and solving for WCMAX, at the mean SIZE = 44.0, yields this 
result. The price inflator used is 1.15. 
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relationship between wages and risks. Based on the estimates in the first column of 
Table 2, which indicate that a $1.00 increase in the weekly maximum benefit results in 
.006 fewer deaths per 100,000 workers, we can compute the portion of the total per week 
wage savings generated by risk reductions. The structural weekly wage equation estimates 
(Table 3, Column 1) indicate that one additional death per 100,000 workers results in 
a weekly wage increase of $1.31.20 Thus, a $10.00 increase in benefits, which lowers the 
death rate by .06, causes weekly wages to fall by $.08 (($1.31)(.06)), or about $5.00 per 
worker annually in 1988 prices. This effect equals about one-tenth of the direct effect of 
benefits on wages, which equals $ 1.10 per week. Thus, compared to the direct effect, this 
indirect effect is relatively unimportant. 
One implication of these results is that safety expenditures induced by the benefit hikes 
are self-financed in part through wage reductions. To get an idea of the magnitude of the 
savings generated by risk reductions in 1982, the year covered by our sample, consider the 
effect of a 10% increase in the benefit maximum, which corresponds roughly to annual 
growth rates in workers' compensation premiums for the years 1977-1983.21 At the mean 
value of WCMAX in our sample ($240.00), the implied increase of $24.00 would lower 
the death rate by .14, with a resulting decline in weekly wages of $.20 (($1.31)(.14)), or 
about $10.00 annually ($12.00 in 1988 prices). This figure, which measures the safety 
incentive effects of workers' compensation acting as an injury tax, dwarfs the OSHA fines 
per worker for the period of about $.50 per year. The $12.00 per worker wage reduction 
also equals approximately one-fifth the reported per worker expenditures on health and 
safety for the year 1981 of $57.00, expressed in 1988 prices.22 
In addition to the self-financing aspect of the risk reductions caused by workers' com- 
pensation increases, there is also a substantial direct wage saving generated by the benefit 
increases. The direct effect of an increase in the benefit maximum equals approximately 
$.107 in weekly wages per dollar of benefits. Thus, if a worker is earning $486.00 per week 
(the mean in our sample) and is above the maximum, which equals, say, $240.00, a 10% 
increase in WCMAX of $24.00 will cause weekly wages to fall by about $2.57, or about 
$150.00 per year in 1988 prices. 
A further implication of the estimated wage trade-off is that it can be used to estimate 
the degree of risk aversion exhibited by workers in our sample. Our estimates imply that a 
$2.40 increase in weekly benefits will reduce wages by $.20, or $ 10.00 per year. The expected 
value to the worker of this $2.40 weekly benefit increase, using a fatality rate of 6.6 deaths 
per 100,000 workers, 52 weeks worked, and 30 years of remaining life for the surviving 
spouse, equals $.24. Thus, the ratio of the cost to the expected benefit is quite high, as the 
cost exceeds the benefit by a factor of about forty. Based on this, one might conclude that 
the trade-off suggests extreme risk aversion. However, this large observed wage trade-off 
might indicate instead that the effective value of the benefit increase depends on the likelihood 
of any accident, not just fatalities. For example, using a nonfatal lost workday accident 
frequency of 4.0 deaths per 100 workers, which is close to the national average for the 
period and an average duration of 13 weeks, and assuming for simplicity that fatal and 
nonfatal accident probabilities are independent, the expected value of the $2.40 benefit 
increase equals about $1.50. Thus, workers give up $ 10.00 in annual wages for about $1.50 
in expected benefits, which is much more plausible. 
We do not have information on the changes in fatality insurance premiums per worker 
208WAGE/8RISK= 5.20- (.0122 + .0040)(WCMAX) = $1.31. 
21 See Price (1984). 
22 Actual expenditures on employee safety and health in 1981 for all businesses, reported by McGraw-Hill 
(1986), were $5,120.4 million. The total civilian labor force in 1981 included 107 million workers, as reported by 
the council of Economic Advisers (1987). Safety expenditure data were taken from The McGraw-Hill Survey of 
Investment in Employee Safety and Health (1986). 
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that would arise due to a 10% increase in the benefit maximum. Therefore, we cannot 
determine what portion of this increase is paid for out of wage reductions. In the absence 
of benefits, annual wages would be $1,475.00 higher (in 1988 prices).23 By way of com- 
parison, total compensation per year for fatality risks, assuming a mean death rate of 6.6 
deaths per 100,000 workers, equals about $500.00 in our results. 
8. Robustness of the results 
* Given the particular estimation strategy followed in this article, our results do not appear 
to be sensitive to the form of the dependent variable in the risk or the wage equations. 
Furthermore, use of the before- or after-tax wage did not alter the results. The final speci- 
fication issue (i.e., the robustness of our results to the specification and estimation approach 
chosen) does not appear to be a problem either. For instance, instrumental variable estimates 
reported in Moore and Viscusi (forthcoming) produce identical results in terms of sign and 
statistical significance of the workers' compensation variables in both the risk and the wage 
equations. We have also estimated a version of the model using the estimation strategy 
developed by Biddle and Zarkin ( 1988); once again, the qualitative nature of our results 
does not change. 
9. Conclusion 
* The workers' compensation program has not enjoyed the most favorable reputation. 
In the past critics charged that benefit levels were not high enough to provide for full income 
replacement. States increased benefits beginning in the 1 970s, but this improvement evoked 
cries of alarm regarding spiralling premium costs and abuses with respect to moral hazard 
problems, such as false claims and overextended periods of recovery from illnesses.24 
Although the moral hazard problems are important, workers' compensation also plays 
a constructive role. The results presented in this article indicate that workplace fatalities 
would increase in the absence of this program. Workers' compensation represents by far 
the most influential governmental program for reducing workplace fatalities. This effec- 
tiveness suggests that if the current level of safety is considered too low, one might wish to 
assess the degree to which some of OSHA's responsibilities could be shifted to an injury 
tax approach. 
Complaints voiced by firms with respect to escalating workers' compensation premiums 
may be overstated, since they neglect the substantial wage offset resulting both from the 
risk reduction induced by workers' compensation and the trade-off workers make between 
ex post insurance compensation and ex ante wage compensation. However, even though 
the net economic cost of workers' compensation to firms is considerably lower than the 
premium level (due to these offsets), firms may not be irrational in their complaints about 
rising premiums, since the costs of the marginal benefit increases are positive. (See Moore 
and Viscusi (1989).) 
The favorable evidence presented here with respect to the performance of workers' 
compensation is not intended to lead observers to dismiss as unimportant the difficult 
causality problems raised by health risks, the litigation problems raised by permanent dis- 
abilities, and the continuing moral hazard problems with respect to nonfatal injury claims 
and their duration.25 Nevertheless, our results do suggest that workers' compensation is 
more successful in promoting its intended objectives than was previously believed. 
23 The weekly wage effect equals $.107 per dollar of benefits. Multiplying by WCMAX ($240.00) and by 50 
weeks yields $1,280.00 per year, or about $1,475.00 in 1988 prices. 
24 See, for example, Smith (1989), Butler and Worral (1985), Kniesner and Leeth (1989, 1988), and Krueger 
(1988) for analyses of moral hazard problems. 
25 For an excellent discussion of the agenda for workers' compensation reform, see Weiler (1986). 
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